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Abstract
We develop a theory of commercialization mode (entry or sale) of entrepreneurial inven-
tions into oligopoly, and show that an invention of higher quality is more likely to be sold
(or licensed) to an incumbent due to strategic product market e⁄ects on the sales price.
Moreover, preemptive acquisitions by incumbents are shown to stimulate the process of cre-
ative destruction by increasing the entrepreneurial e⁄ort allocated to high-quality invention
projects. Using detailed data on patents granted to small ￿rms and individuals, we ￿nd
evidence that high-quality inventions are often sold, and that they are sold under bidding
competition.
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Schumpeter (1942) argued that the ongoing process where new inventions create ”monopoly
rents” for entrepreneurs while reducing rents for incumbent ﬁrms is central for sustained growth
in a market economy. This process of ”creative destruction” and its welfare implications has
been studied in formal theory in the case where an entrepreneur commercializes the invention by
entering the product market.1 However, if incumbent proﬁts are hurt by entrepreneurial entry,
incumbents should have an incentive to block entry by acquiring these entrepreneurial ﬁrms
(or their inventions). Indeed, entrepreneurial inventions are often sold or licensed to incumbent
ﬁrms.2 Figure 1.1 shows the importance of commercialization by sale in the last decade by
depicting the exit value through M&As (proxying for commercialization by sale to incumbents)
and IPOs (proxying for commercialization by entry), respectively, in the US venture capital
market.
The purpose of this paper is to study how the innovation process is aﬀected by the fact
that entrepreneurial entry might be blocked by preemptive acquisitions by incumbents. To
this end, we construct a theoretical model with the following ingredients: Initially, an entre-
preneur decides how much to invest in research to discover an invention. Then, if successful,
the entrepreneur could either enter the product market with the invention or sell it to one of
many incumbent ﬁrms competing to acquire the invention. Finally, ﬁrms compete in oligopoly
fashion, thereby generating proﬁts.
We ﬁrst show that the incentive for commercialization by sale relative to commercialization
by entry increases with a higher quality of the invention. This occurs because higher invention
quality increases entrants’ and acquirers’ proﬁts in a similar fashion, but also reduces the proﬁt
when not acquiring the invention. This implies that the incumbent’s willingness to pay for
the invention increases more than the entrant’s proﬁt in quality and thereby the entrepreneur
beneﬁts from selling the invention instead of entering the market.
We then turn to how the quality of an invention aﬀects the research incentives. When
the entrepreneur commercializes by entry, she will set the eﬀort level such that the marginal
cost of research equals the marginal change in product market proﬁt as an entrant. When
commercializing by sale, the marginal cost will be the same but the marginal revenue will
be higher at a high level of quality. Once again, increased quality of the invention does not
only increase the proﬁt of an acquirer of the invention but will also decrease the proﬁto fa
1 In the endogenous growth literature see, for instance, Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and
Helpman (1991), Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulos (1990), and Howitt (2008) for an overview, and in
the Industrial Organization literature see, for instance, Arrow (1962), Gilbert and Newberry (1982) and
Gilbert (2006) for an overview.
2 Granstrand and Sjölander (1990) present evidence from Sweden, and Hall (1990) presents evidence
from the US that ﬁrms acquire innovative targets to gain access to their technologies. Bloningen and
Taylor (2000) ﬁnd evidence from US high-tech industries of ﬁrms making a strategic choice between the
acquisition of outside innovators and in-house R&D. In the biotech industry, Lerner and Merges (1998)
note that acquisitions are important for know-how transfers. Baumol (2004) stresses the importance of
the diﬀerent roles played by small entrepreneurial ﬁrms and large established ﬁrms in the innovation
process in the USA, where small entrepreneurial ﬁrms create a large share of breakthrough innovations
















Figure 1.1: The value of exits through M&A and IPO in the US. Source: Thomson Venture
Economics/National Venture Capital Association.
non-acquirer. Both these eﬀects will increase incumbents’ willingness to pay, thus driving the
sales price above the entrepreneur’s proﬁt as an entrant. Entrepreneurs who commercialize by
sale therefore have a stronger incentive to develop high-quality inventions than entrepreneurs
who commercialize by entry. Since preemptive incumbent acquisitions give entrepreneurs the
incentive to increase their eﬀorts in high-quality research projects, expected consumer welfare
can be higher under commercialization by sale despite the risk of increased market power.
Next, we derive an estimation equation from the entrepreneur’s decision of commercialization
(sale or entry), and test it on a detailed dataset on patents granted to Swedish small ﬁrms and
individual inventors. We use forward patent citations as a proxy for the quality of the invention.
Consistent with theory, we ﬁnd that higher patent quality is conducive to commercialization
by sale. The estimates show that if a patent receives one more forward citation in a ﬁve-year
period, the probability of sale increases by about ﬁve percentage points. Additional predictions
of the model such as higher entry costs being conducive to sale are also supported by data.
Importantly, our estimates identify preemptive bidding competition between incumbent ﬁrms.
We undertake a number of extensions of the empirical analyses. These include estimating a
multinomial logit model, a probit model with selection and a duration model to control for the
fact the data include patents that are not commercialized. These extensions yield no qualitative
changes in results and, in particular, forward citations remain conducive to commercialization
by sale.
This paper relates to the literature studying which type of products will be sold on the
market. In his seminal paper, Akerlof (1970) showed that informational asymmetries can give
rise to adverse selection on markets, resulting in that only low-quality products will be sold.3 In
3 The existing empirical literature on the ”lemons” eﬀect gives mixed evidence. For instance, Bond
(1982) found no evidence, Genesove (1993) weak evidence, and Gilligan (2004) strong evidence of adverse
3contrast, we show theoretically that when inventions are sold into oligopolistic markets, absent
the information problem, product market externalities imply that only high-quality products
will be sold on the market. We also ﬁnd empirical evidence that only high-quality inventions are
sold on the market, using patent data. However, these data also show that commercialization by
sale takes longer than commercialization by entry; thus, the asymmetric information problem
could materialize in the cost of sale preparation.
This paper also contributes to the literature on commercialization mode, which has shown
how diﬀerent types of transaction costs and entry costs aﬀect the commercialization mode (see,
for instance, Anton and Yao (1994), Gans and Stern (2000) and Gans et al. (2002)). We
add to this literature by theoretically and empirically showing that when the invention will
be commercialized under bidding competition in an oligopolistic market, the invention is more
likely to be commercialized through a sale to an incumbent, the higher is its quality.
This paper also relates to the literature on auctions with externalities (see, for instance,
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996, 1999)). We add to this literature by endogenizing the
choice of whether to sell the asset or use it to compete with the potential bidders. Moreover,
to our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to provide evidence of preemptive bidding competition.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on entrepreneurship (for overviews, see
Audreatch and Achs (2005) and Bianchi and Henrekson (2005)), by constructing an oligopoly
model where the equilibrium commercialization mode pattern, the acquisition price and the
entrepreneur’s investments are endogenously determined.4
2. The theoretical model.
The interaction is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Consider a market served by n symmetric incumbent
ﬁrms. There is also an entrepreneur, denoted e. In stage 1, the entrepreneur decides how much
to invest in research, thereby aﬀecting the probability of discovering an invention with a ﬁxed
quality k.5 In stage 2, if successful, the entrepreneur commercializes the invention into an
innovation. She either sells the invention at a ﬁrst-price perfect information auction, where the
n incumbent ﬁrms are the potential buyers, or enters the product market. There may then be
exits of incumbent ﬁrms. Finally, in stage 3, the active ﬁrms in the product market compete
in oligopoly interaction, setting an action xi. Following the literature, we will try use the term
"invention" as long as k has not reached the market, while using the term "innovation" when
k is used in the product market.
selection.
4 This paper is also related to the literature on patent licensing (for an overview, see Kamien (1992),
and to the literature on the persistence of monopoly (see, for instance, Chen (2000) and Gilbert and
Newbery (1982). However, to our knowledge, these literatures do not study how the trade-oﬀ between
entry and sales (licence) for the potential entrant depends on the quality of the invention, which is the
focus of our analysis.
5 The quality of an invention k is for many types of inventions ﬁxed, such as for vaccines, or solutions
to speciﬁc technical problems. However, for other inventions the quality of an invention can be aﬀected,
such as the capacity of a micro processor. We discuss the case where the entrepreneur chooses the quality
in Section 5.1.
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Figure 2.1: The structure of the game.
52.1. Stage 3: Product-market equilibrium
L e tt h es e to fﬁrms in the industry be J = e∪I,w h e r eI ={i1,i 2...in} is the set of incumbent
ﬁrms. Denote the owner of the entrepreneur’s invention, k,b yl ∈ J. Using backward induction,
we start with product market interaction where ﬁrm j chooses an action xj ∈ R+ to maximize
its direct product market proﬁt, πj(xj,x−j,l) − τ, which depends on its own and its rivals’
market actions, xj and x−j, the identity of the owner of the invention, l,a n daﬁxed cost τ to
serve the market. We may consider the action xj as setting a quantity or a price, as will be
shown in later sections. We assume there to exist a unique Nash-Equilibrium, x∗ (l),d e ﬁned as:
πj(x∗
j,x ∗
−j : l,k) ≥ πj(xj,x ∗
−j : l,k), ∀xj ∈ R+, (2.1)
where we assume the product market proﬁts to be positive.
From (2.1), we can deﬁne a reduced-form product market proﬁtf o raﬁrm j, taking as given
ownership l:
πj (l) ≡ πj(x∗
j (l),x ∗
−j(l),l). (2.2)
The assumption that incumbents i1,i 2,...,i n are symmetric before the acquisition takes
place implies that we need only distinguish between two types of ownership; entrepreneurial
ownership (l = e)a n dincumbent ownership (l = i). Note that there are then three types of
ﬁrms of which to keep track, h = {e,A,NA}, i.e. the entrepreneurial ﬁrm (e), an acquiring
incumbent (A) and the non-acquiring incumbents (NA).
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Deﬁnitions 1 (i) and (ii) state that the reduced-form product market proﬁt for the possessor is
strictly increasing in the quality of the invention, whereas Deﬁnition 1 (iii) states that increased
quality strictly decreases the rivals’ proﬁts. This will, for instance, hold for a process innovation
where a more drastic innovation leads to a larger reduction in the marginal cost of selling and
producing for the product market.
Example 1 (The LC-model). As an example, we use a Linear-Cournot model (LC-model).
This model is also used to derive more speciﬁc results. The oligopoly interaction in period 3 is
Cournot competition in homogenous goods. The product market proﬁti sπj =( P −cj)qj where
ﬁrms face inverse demand P = a − 1
s
PN
i=1 qi,w h e r ea>0 is a demand parameter, s may be
interpreted as the size of the market, and N is the total number of ﬁrms in the market. In the
LC-model, ownership of the invention reduces the marginal cost. Making a distinction between
ﬁrm types, we have:
cNA = c, cA = c − k, cE = c − k. (2.3)
In the LC model, (2.1) takes the form
∂πj
∂qj = P − cj −
qj
s =0∀j,w h i c hc a nb es o l v e df o r
optimal quantities q∗(l).N o t i n gt h a t
∂πj
∂qj =0implies P − cj = −
qj
















l = e,i.N o t et h a tmax : N(i)=n(i) and max : N(e)=n(e)+1where n(l) ≤ n is the number
6of active incumbent ﬁrms. Holding the total number of ﬁrms N(l) ﬁxed, it thus follows that
reduced-form proﬁts πj (l) fulﬁll Deﬁnition 1.
2.2. Stage 2: Commercialization
In stage 2, there is ﬁrst an entry-acquisition game where the entrepreneur can decide whether to
s e l lt h ei n v e n t i o nt oo n eo ft h ei n c u m b e n t so re n t e rt h em a r k e ta taﬁxed cost, G. Given the mode
of commercialization of the invention, there may then be exits of non-acquiring incumbents.
The ﬁrm in possession of the invention is assumed to always make positive proﬁts, i.e. we
assume the quality of the invention k to be suﬃciently large so that πA(l) >τand πE(e) >τ+G
holds. Non-acquiring incumbents will exit until the total number of ﬁrms on the market N(l)
fulﬁls the exit condition:
πNA(l : N(l)) >τ, π NA(l : N(l)+1 )<τ, (2.4)
where max : N(i)=n(i) and max : N(e)=n(e)+1 ,w h e r en(l) ≤ n.
The commercialization process is depicted as an auction where n incumbents simultaneously
post bids and the entrepreneur then either accepts or rejects these bids. If the entrepreneur
rejects these bids, she will enter the market. Each incumbent announces a bid, bi,f o rt h e
invention. b =( b1,..b i..,bm) ∈ Rm is the vector of these bids. Following the announcement
of b, the invention may be sold to one of the incumbents at the bid price, or remain in the
ownership of entrepreneur e. If more than one bid is accepted, the bidder with the highest bid
obtains the invention. If there is more than one incumbent with such a bid, each such incumbent
obtains the invention with equal probability. The acquisition is solved for Nash equilibria in
undominated pure strategies. There is a smallest amount, ε, chosen such that all inequalities
are preserved if ε is added or subtracted.
There are three diﬀerent valuations:
• vii in (2.5) is the value for an incumbent of obtaining k, when a rival incumbent would
otherwise obtain k.T h eﬁrst term shows the proﬁt when possessing the invention k.T h e
second term shows the expected proﬁti far i v a li n c u m b e n to b t a i n sk,w h e r eΓ is the
transaction cost associated with acquiring the invention k,a n dλ(i) is the probability of
s t a y i n gi nt h em a r k e ta san o n - a c q u i r e r
vii = πA(i) − τ − Γ − λ(i)[πNA(i) − τ]. (2.5)
• vie in (2.6) is the value for an incumbent of obtaining k, when the entrepreneur would
otherwise keep it. The proﬁt for an incumbent of not obtaining invention k is diﬀerent in
this case, due to the change of identity of the ﬁrm that would otherwise possess the assets
vie = πA(i) − τ − Γ − λ(e)[πNA(e) − τ]. (2.6)
• ve in (2.7) is the value for the entrepreneur of keeping an invention with quality k and
7entering the market
ve = πE(e) − τ − G. (2.7)
Note that we assume that πE(i)=0 , so that the entrepreneur cannot enter the market
without ownership of the invention. Note also that one possibility is that entry takes place
through a sale to a large ﬁrm outside this industry.
We can now proceed to solve for the Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS). Since incum-
bents are symmetric, valuations vii,v ie and ve can be ordered in six diﬀerent ways, as shown in
table 2.1. These inequalities are useful for solving the model and illustrating the results. The
following lemma can be stated:
Lemma 1. Equilibrium ownership l∗, acquisition price S∗ and entrepreneurial reward RE are
described in table 2.1:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Table 2.1: The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price.
Inequality: Deﬁnition: Ownership l∗: Acquisition price, S∗: Entrepreneurial reward, RE :
I1: vii >v ie >v e i vii vii
I2: vii >v e >v ie i or ev ii vii or ve
I3: vie >v ii >v e i vii vii
I4: vie >v e >v ii i ve ve
I5: ve >v ii >v ie e . ve
I6: ve >v ie >v ii e . ve
Lemma 1 shows that when one of the inequalities I1,I 3,o rI4 holds, k is obtained by one of
the incumbents. Under I1 and I3, the acquiring incumbent pays the acquisition price S = vii,
and S = ve under I4.W h e nI5 or I6 holds, the entrepreneur keeps its assets. When I2 holds,
there exist multiple equilibria. The last column summarizes the reward RE accruing to the
entrepreneur.
2.3. Stage 1: Eﬀort by the entrepreneur
In stage 1, entrepreneur e invests in research ρE to succeed with the invention k.F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,
assume that the probability of succeeding with an invention is simply the eﬀort, i.e. ρE ∈ [0,1],
and that eﬀort is associated with an increasing and convex cost y(ρ),i . e . y0(ρ) > 0, and
y00(ρ) > 0.W i t hRE(l) given from Lemma 1, ΠE = ρERE(l) − y(ρE) is the expected net proﬁt
of undertaking a research eﬀort for the entrepreneur. The optimal eﬀort ρ∗
E is given from:
dΠE
dρE
= RE(l) − y0(ρ∗
E(l)) = 0, (2.8)





8Applying the implicit function theorem in (2.8), we can state the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. The equilibrium eﬀort by the entrepreneur in stage 1, ρ∗
E(l) and hence, the proba-




3. Why entrepreneurs sell their best inventions
In this section, we examine how the mode of commercialization — by entry or by sale — is related
to the quality of the invention, k.I t i s t h e n u s e f u l t o d e ﬁne the net value of an incumbent
acquisition, i.e. the diﬀerence between incumbents’ valuations and the entry value for the
entrepreneur, vil −ve. In particular, note that from Lemma 1, commercialization by sale occurs
as a unique equilibrium if and only if vil − ve > 0.
Using (2.5)-(2.7), we have:
vil − ve =[ πA(i) − πE(e)+G − Γ] − λ(l)[πNA(l) − τ],l = {e,i}. (3.1)
Examining the net value of an acquisition (3.1), the ﬁrst term is an invention-transfer eﬀect and
shows the change in proﬁts from an ownership change of the invention from the entrepreneur
to an incumbent ﬁrm. The second term can be viewed as the opportunity cost of an ownership
change, since this terms captures the proﬁt for an incumbent when not acquiring the invention.
3.1. Market-structure neutral entry
To isolate how the quality of the invention k aﬀects the entrepreneur’s choice between entering
and selling the invention, we will assume that the entrant and the acquirer make a symmetric
use of assets, and will obtain a symmetric market position when exposed to the same market
conditions, i.e. πA(i)=πE(e) when the total number of ﬁrms on the market is N = n(i)=n(e).
We refer to such entry as ”large scale entry”. Once more, note that one possibility is that large
scale entry takes place through a sale to a large ﬁrm outside this industry which uses the
invention to enter the market.6
To proceed, we then use the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2. πNA(l,¯ k(l)) = τ for l = e,i.
¯ k(l) is thus the maximum quality of the invention such that all non-acquirers can cover their
ﬁxed cost τ associated with serving the market. It follows that ¯ k(i) > ¯ k(e), since non-acquirers’
proﬁts will be lower with one more ﬁrm in the market.
We then make the following assumption:
Assumption A1 Entry is Market—structure-neutral-entry: k ∈ (¯ k(e),¯ k(i)).
Thus, when k ∈ (¯ k(e),¯ k(i)), entry by the entrepreneur leads to the exit of one incumbent
ﬁrm, i.e. N(l)=n. Assumption A1 thus implies that the entrant obtains exactly the same
market position as would the acquiring incumbent in the case of a sale of the invention, i.e.
6 The LC-model in Example 1 fulﬁlls the large scale entry assumption.
9πA(i)=πE(e). Moreover, since one of the incumbents is forced out of the market under
entry, we have that the probability of remaining in the market for a non-acquiring incumbent
is λ(i) = 1 >λ (e) = n−1
n > 0.
Assumption A1 greatly simpliﬁes the exposition while, as will be seen in Section 3.2, not
qualitatively aﬀecting the results. Under Assumption A1, the net value for an incumbent in
(3.1) can be written as:
vil − ve =
(




[πNA(e) − τ],l = e
vii − ve = G + τ − Γ − πNA(i),l = i
, (3.2)
where the invention-transfer eﬀect is now given from the net ﬁxed cost savings, G − T.I n
(3.2), vie−ve thus represents the net value for an incumbent of deterring entry,w h e r e a svii−ve
represents the net value for an incumbent of preempting rivals from obtaining the entrepreneur’s
invention.
To characterize the entrepreneur’s choice of mode of commercialization, we make use of the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3. Let kED be deﬁned from vie(kED,·)=ve(kED,·) and kPEbe deﬁned from
vii(kPE,·)=ve(kPE,·).
kED is thus the quality level where the entry-deterring motive for an incumbent acquisition
just matches the entrepreneur’s entry value, whereas kPE is the quality level where the preemp-
tive motive for an incumbent acquisition is equal to the entrepreneur’s entry value. Note that
from (3.2), the existence of the cut-oﬀ qualities kED and kPE requires that entry costs G are
larger than the transaction cost Γ.
We then have the following Lemma:
Lemma 3. Suppose that Assumption A1 holds and kED and kPE exist. Then, (i) commercial-
ization by entry takes place if the quality of the invention is suﬃciently low, k ∈ (¯ k(e),kED),
(ii) commercialization by sale occurs at sales price S∗ = ve if the quality of the invention is
of intermediate size, k ∈ [kED,kPE), and (iii) commercialization by sale occurs at sales price
S∗ = vii if the quality of the invention is suﬃciently high, k ∈ [kPE,¯ k(i)).
Lemma 3 is proved below and illustrated in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1(i) solves the acquisition
entry game as a function of the quality of the invention, k. When the quality of the invention
is low k ∈ (¯ k(e),kED), the net value for entry deterrence is negative, i.e. an incumbent’s entry
deterring valuation is lower than the entrant’s entry value, vie − ve < 0. In this region, the
entrepreneur will thus choose commercialization by entry (l∗ = e).
What happens if the quality of the invention increases? Diﬀerentiate the net value of entry







dk > 0, (3.3)
where we use v0
k as the notation for the derivative, dv
dk. Thus, the entry-deterring valuation of
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Figure 3.1: Solving for the equilibrium mode of commercialization.
11of the invention increases. To see why, note that the ﬁrst term in vie = πA(i) − τ − Γ −
λ(e)[πNA(e) − τ] increases by the same amount as the ﬁrst term in ve = πE(e) − τ − G,s i n c e
the acquiring incumbent and the entrepreneur have the same increase in proﬁt from Assumption
A1, πA(i)=πE(e). However, since the proﬁt of a non-acquirer πN(e) decreases in k,t h e r e
is an additional increase in the incumbent’s valuation, thereby implying that v0
ie,k >v 0
e,k.
Thus, since an incumbent’s net value of entry deterrence vie − ve is increasing in the quality
of the invention k,a nentry deterring acquisition at the acquisition price S∗ = ve occurs at
k = kED, as shown in Figure 3.1(ii). Other incumbents will not preempt a rival acquisition in
the region k ∈ [kED,kPE), since the net value of preemption is negative, vii−ve < 0.T h u s ,t h e
entrepreneur will commercialize by sale (l∗ = i)a tp r i c eS∗ = πE(e) − τ − G in this region.
What if the quality increases even further? Since a higher quality decreases the proﬁt
of a non-acquiring incumbent also when there is an incumbent acquisition, the net value of





dk > 0. (3.4)
As shown in Figure 3.1(i), increasing the quality of the invention into the region k ≥ kPE will
then imply that the net value of preemption is strictly positive, vii − ve > 0. This induces a
bidding war between incumbents driving the equilibrium sales price above the entry value for
the entrepreneur, S∗ = vii = πA(i)−Γ−πNA(i) >v e. The entrepreneur will thus commercialize
by sale (l∗ = i), receiving the sales price S∗ = vii in this region.
Let us now derive additional predictions. Figure 3.1(iii) shows how the equilibrium ownership
is jointly determined by the quality of the invention k and the entry cost G.L e tGED(kED) be
the entry-deterrence condition (ED-condition) deﬁned from vie(kED,G)=ve(kED,G), and let
GPE(kPE) be the preemption condition (PE-condition) deﬁned from vii(kPE,G)=ve(kPE,G).









πNA(e),G PE(k)=Γ − τ + πNA(i). (3.5)
The loci associated with the takeover condition GED(kED) and the preemption condition
GPE(kPE) are downward-sloping in the k − G space. This follows from the proﬁt of a non-
acquirer πNA(l) decreasing in the quality of the invention k,a n dal o w e rﬁxed entry cost G
being needed to balance the incumbent’s higher value of obtaining the invention. The equilib-
rium ownership structure involves commercialization by entry below the entry deterrence locus
GED(k), indicated as l∗ = e. Entry deterring acquisitions occur for combinations of k and G
between the takeover locus GED(k) and the preemption locus GPE(k), indicated as l∗ = i and
S∗ = ve. Preemptive acquisitions occur above the preemption locus GPE(k), as indicated by
l∗ = i and S∗ = vii. From (3.5), we also note that increases in transaction costs Γ shift the entry
deterrence locus GED(k) and the preemption locus upwards in Figure 3.1(iii), thus reducing the
region where commercialization by sale occurs, whereas increasing the ﬁxed operating cost τ
has the opposing eﬀect.
Thus, we can state the following result:
Proposition 1. Assume that Assumption A1 holds. In the choice between commercializing by
12sale to incumbents and entering the market, an entrepreneur will then prefer sale when (i) the
quality of the invention k is high, (ii) when entry costs G are high, (iii) when operating ﬁxed
costs τ are high, and (iv) when the transaction costs associated with a sale Γ are low.
3.2. Non-market-structure neutral entry
We will now relax Assumption A1. Let us ﬁrst examine the case when the quality of the invention
is so low that no incumbent is forced out of the market post-entry, i.e. N(i)=n<N(e)=n+1,
i.e. we assume
Assumption A2 Non-neutral-entry without exit: k ∈ (0,¯ k(i)).
From (2.5), (2.6), and 2.7), (3.1) now becomes:
vil − ve =[ πA(i) − Γ − πE(e)+G] − [πNA(l) − τ],l = {e,i}. (3.6)














l = {e,i}. (3.7)
The main diﬀerence from the above analysis is that the eﬀects on the entrant and the acquirer
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dk holds, i.e. a larger acquirer (as compared to the entrant) would have
more to gain from increased quality due to larger sales, and v0
ie,k − v0
e,k > 0.A sc a nb es h o w n ,
we can state the following result7:
Lemma 4. Proposition 3 is fulﬁlled in the LC-model for k ∈ (0,¯ k(i)).
What would then happen if we allowed for such drastic inventions that more than one
incumbent ﬁrm would exit the market? Let πm denote the monopoly proﬁt. Then, make the
following assumption
Assumption A3 k ∈ (¯ k(i),kmax],w h e r eπA(i)=πE(e)=πm for k = kmax.
Under Assumption A3, (3.6) becomes
vil − ve =[ πA(i) − Γ − πE(e)+G] − λ(l)[πNA(l) − τ],l= {e,i}´ . (3.8)
To see that a higher quality of the invention is conducive to innovation also in this setting,
suppose that vil−ve > 0 holds for some k>¯ k(i).N o t et h a tt h eﬁrst term in (3.8) would remain
positive, while the second term would decrease in the quality of the invention. The second term
could increase discretely when the exit of an incumbent takes place (since πNA increases). Such
discrete changes would nevertheless decrease in size as non-acquirers become smaller. While
t h e r ew o u l db es i t u a t i o n sw h e r es m a l lc h a n g e si nq u a l i t yi m p l yt h a tw em o v ef r o ma ne q u i l i b r i u m
7 Proofs are available from the authors upon request.
13of commercialization by sale to one with commercialization by entry, commercialization by sale
will prevail when the quality of the invention becomes suﬃciently high.8
4. Why preemptive acquisitions may promote the process of creative destruc-
tion
In this section, we will show that preemptive acquisition will accelerate the process of cre-
ative destruction. To illustrate this, ﬁrst assume that Assumption A1 holds. The following
proposition concerning research incentives for the entrepreneur is then immediate:
Proposition 2. Assume that Assumption A1 holds, then ρ∗(i) >ρ ∗(e) for k ∈ [kPE,¯ k(i)).
That is, entrepreneurs with high-quality projects will be substantially more likely to succeed
with an invention under commercialization by sale as compared to commercialization by entry.
The proposition is proved in Figure 4.1 where, for convenience, Figure 4.1(i) derives the
equilibrium commercialization strategy for the entrepreneur and Figure 4.1(ii) depicts the re-
ward of the entrepreneur RE(l) as a function of the quality of the invention k. When quality
is low k ∈ (¯ k(e)),kED), commercialization by entry occurs and the reward is RE(e)=ve =
πE(e)−τ −G for the entrepreneur. From Deﬁnition 1, RE(e) is increasing in quality and from
Lemma 2, the research incentives are increased. The same holds if an entry deterring acquisition
occurs in region k ∈ [kED,kPE) since RE(i)=S∗ = ve.
However, at an even higher quality k ≥ kPE, preemptive acquisitions occur, and the bidding
competition between incumbents over the beneﬁts as an acquirer — as well as over avoiding
a weak position as a non-acquirer — drives the reward for commercialization by sale to be
strictly higher than the reward for commercialization by entry, RE(i)=vii >v e = RE(e).
But then, since the research eﬀort and hence, the likelihood of a successful innovation ρ∗(l),
is increasing in the reward RE(l) from Lemma 2, it directly follows that the probability of a
successful invention will be higher under commercialization by sale. This is illustrated in Figure
4.1(iii) which shows that preemptive incumbent acquisitions of entrepreneurial inventions can
be productive by substantially increasing the research incentives for entrepreneurs.
More generally, we may also note that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that preemptive in-
cumbent acquisitions will always increase the reward to research for entrepreneurs substantially,
since S∗ = vii >v e and hence ρ∗(i) >ρ ∗(e) will hold for any of the inequalities I1, I2 or I3 in
table 2.1.
4.1. Preemptive acquisitions and welfare
Let us ﬁrst examine how incumbent acquisitions of entrepreneurial inventions aﬀect consumer
welfare. To this end, we compare a Non-discriminatory (ND) policy (where incumbent acquisi-
tions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms are allowed) to a Discriminatory (D) policy (which prohibits the
acquisitions of small innovative ﬁrms). Consider a stage 0 where a government chooses between
the two polices. Formally, let ¯ Γ be deﬁned from vie(·, ¯ Γ)=0 .I nt h eN D - p o l i c y ,Γ < ¯ Γ,w h e r e a s
in the D-policy, Γ > ¯ Γ. This is a highly stylized comparison, but it can be seen as a simple way of
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Figure 4.1: The equilibrium reward to innovation and the equilibrium probabality of success.
15capturing the eﬀects of substantial changes of transaction costs for acquisitions due to changes
in policies that might block or increase the cost of acquisitions of small innovative ﬁrms.91 0
The change in transaction costs could also stem from technological and institutional changes.
Assume that, all else equal, consumers beneﬁt from a higher quality of the innovation and
from more ﬁrms being present in the market. Let the consumer surplus under ownership l be
denoted CS(l),a n dl e tCS(0) denote the consumer surplus when the entrepreneur fails. From






ρ(e)[CS(i)) − CS(e)] ≤ 0,f o rI 4
ρ(i)[CS(i) − CS(0)] − ρ(e)[CS(e) − CS(0)] for I1-I3,
(4.1)
noting that ρ(e)=ρ(i) under I4 in Table 2.1.
If incumbent acquisitions are driven by entry deterrence motives, consumers will be better oﬀ
from the Discriminatory policy, as shown by CSND−D ≤ 0 under I4. However, the diﬀerential
CSND−D in (4.1) also reveals that consumers may prefer the ND-policy when inventions are sold
under bidding competition, since a successful invention is more likely, i.e. since ρ∗
E(i) >ρ ∗
E(e)
under inequalities I1-I3 in Table 2.1. Since a higher quality of the invention will induce bidding
competition among incumbents, this suggests that consumers may prefer the ND-policy when
potential innovations are of high quality. This is shown by the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If inventions have a suﬃciently high quality k>¯ k(e), consumers will prefer
the ND-policy over the D-policy, CSND−D > 0.
Proof. First, note that k>¯ k(e) implies that n(i)=n(e) from Deﬁnitions 2 and 3 and, hence,
CS(i)=CS(e), since no market power eﬀect then arises from the acquisition. The higher
entrepreneurial research eﬀort under the ND policy ρ∗
E(i) >ρ ∗
E(e) then implies CSND−D > 0
for k>¯ k(e).
Thus, preemptive incumbents’ acquisitions may beneﬁt consumers by giving entrepreneurs
stronger incentives to succeed with high-quality inventions. For inventions of lower quality
k<¯ k(e),t h em a r k e tp o w e re ﬀect may dominate the higher probability of a successful invention.
Let us end with a brief remark on how the total surplus is aﬀected by policy. It directly
follows that the entrepreneur gains from the ND-policy, since the bidding competition may give
premium reward to successful invention.11 What about incumbents? Let πN(0) denote the
proﬁt for incumbents absent the invention. From Lemma 1, we can then derive the diﬀerence
in expected incumbents’ proﬁts from the two polices:
9 Examples are a restrictive merger policy in R&D industries, or tax policies concerning the sale of
innovative ﬁrms.
10 An alternative policy with qualitatively the same eﬀect would be a reduction in the cost of entry.
11 To see this, deﬁne the reduced-form entrepreneurial proﬁta sΠE(l)=ρ∗(l)RE(l) − y(ρ∗(l)).S i n c e
RND
E (l)=RD
E = ve under I4, I5 or I6 in Table 2.1, whereas RND
E (l)=S∗ = vii >R D
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(4.2)
Expression (4.2) reveals that which policy incumbents prefer is ambiguous. For instance,
under preemptive acquisitions, when one of the inequalities I1-I3 in Table 2.1 is fulﬁlled, there
is a larger expected loss of ex ante rents due to higher research eﬀorts under the ND policy (as
s h o w nb yt h eﬁrst term in the third line). But, given that the entrepreneur succeeds, which
occurs with probability ρ∗(l), the expected proﬁt is higher under the ND-policy since incumbents
either gain from a higher concentration by avoiding entry or by avoiding a less uncertain position
as a non-acquirer (as shown by the second term in the third line).
5. Empirical analysis
We now turn to the empirical analysis. We ﬁrst derive a probit model from the entrepreneur’s
decision on the mode of commercialization in stage 2, which is then estimated on a unique
dataset on patents granted to Swedish small ﬁrms and individual inventors.
5.1. Deriving an estimation equation for the mode of commercialization
To identify if the model is consistent with the data and, in particular, with preemptive acqui-
sitions, we will estimate the entrepreneur’s choice of commercialization in Stage 2. Then, let
Re,m be the reward for an entrepreneur e choosing commercialization mode m =( Sale,Entry),
consisting of the reward RE,m(ke,τe,Γe,G e) given from Lemma 1 and a stochastic term εe,m,
i.e.
Re,m = RE,m(ke,τe,Γe,G e)+εe,m,m =( Sale,Entry), (5.1)
where εe,m captures idiosyncractic factors aﬀecting entrepreneur e’s choice of commercialization
not captured in the theory. In what follows, we assume that the entrepreneur knows Re,m and
its components, while the error term is unknown to the econometrician.
To proceed, we linearize RE,m(ke,τe,Γe,G e) in its components assuming that Assumption
A1 is fulﬁlled. Noting that RE,Entry(ke,τe,Γe,G e)=ve under entry, whereas RE,Sale(ke,τe,Γe,G e)=
S∗ under sale, we have:




















To identify preemptive acquisitions in the data, we proceed as follows. First, note that the
signs in (5.2) directly follow from (2.7) and Deﬁnition 1. In (5.3), we note that when an entry-
17deterring acquisition takes place, S∗ = ve,a n dβ = α. In contrast, when an acquisition is
preemptive, the bidding competition between incumbents drives up the the acquisition price
to S∗ = vii >v e, which implies β 6= α. To see this, ﬁrst note that (3.4) implies βk − αk > 0,
which is illustrated in Figure 4.1(ii) where the reward-locus under sale and bidding competition,
RE = vii, being steeper in quality k than the corresponding reward under innovation for entry,
RE = ve. Then, note that (2.5) and (2.7) directly imply βG − αG > 0, βΓ − αΓ < 0 and
βτ − ατ > 0.
Using (5.1)-(5.3), we can now write down the probability that the entrepreneur will choose
commercialization by sale as:
Prob[Salee] = Prob[Re,Sale >R e,Entry] = Prob[εe,Entry − εe,Sale < x0
e(β − α)]







where γ = β − α and f(εe) is the density of the error term, εe = εe,Entry − εe,Sale.I f εe,m
is distributed according to the Gumbel distribution, then εe will be distributed according to
the logistic distribution and F(x0
eγ)=Λ(x0
eγ),w h e r eΛ(·) is the cumulative density function
of the logistic distribution. When εe,m are mean-zero normally distributed, εe will also be
normally distributed and F(x0
eγ)=Φ(x0
eγ),w h e r eΦ(·) is the cumulative density function of






where me =1when commercialization by sale is chosen and me =0when commercialization
by entry is chosen.
Thus, using the fact that γ = β − α in (5.4), we can derive a testable hypothesis on the
nature of incumbent acquisitions from our proposed model. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumption A1 holds. Then:
(i) If commercialization by sale takes place by entry-deterring acquisitions at S∗ = ve, then
γ = 0,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,β = α.
(ii) If commercialization by sale takes place by preemptive acquisitions at S∗ = vii >v e,
γ 6= 0,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,β 6= α. More speciﬁcally, γk = βk − αk > 0, γG = βG − αG > 0,
γΓ = βΓ − αΓ < 0 and γτ = βτ − ατ > 0.
Before proceeding, we make a number of remarks on the generality of Proposition 4.
Assumption A1: Proposition 4 does not require that entrepreneurial entry is "market neu-
tral". This follows directly from table 2.1 (which applies also in situations where Assumptions
A2 and A3 are fulﬁlled) where we again note that preemptive bidding competition implies
S∗ = vii >v e.
Linearization of RE,m(·): Proposition 4 is based on a linearization of RE,m(·) in (5.1).
Ambiguities may then arise in Proposition 4(ii), since theory gives no guidance to whether
18RE,m(·) is concave or convex in k. Note however that (2.5) and (2.7) implies that RE,m is linear
in G and T. Then, simultaneously ﬁnding that γk > 0, γG > 0, γΓ < 0 and γτ > 0 can only be
only consistent with preemptive bidding competition between incumbents generating the sales
price S∗ = vii >v e.
Proposition 1: Propositions 4(i) and (ii) are, respectively, suﬃcient conditions for the theory
in Proposition 1. That is, in terms of Figure 4.1(ii), evidence for Proposition 4(ii) must imply
that incumbent acquisitions take place in the dark-shaded area where acquisitions are preemp-
tive at S∗ = vii, whereas evidence for Proposition 4(i) would correspond to acquisitions taking
place in the light-shaded area where acquisitions are entry-deterring at S∗ = ve. Rejecting our
proposed theory on the mode of commercialization of entrepreneurial inventions thus requires
γ 6= 0 as well as a reversal of all signs in Proposition 4(ii).
Endogenous quality: Proposition 4 also holds in a setting where the entrepreneur chooses
the level of quality k in stage 1 (rather than aﬀecting the probability of discovering an invention
of a given quality). To see this, let C(k) be a strictly convex development cost. Assuming
that Assumption A1 is fulﬁlled, (2.5) and (2.7) then imply kSale =a r g m a x k [vii − C(k)] >
kEntry =a r gm a x k [ve − C(k)]. Thus, our theory would also predict that entrepreneurs choosing
commercialization by sale will have a stronger incentive to develop inventions to higher quality.
This suggests a potential endogeniety problem in (5.4). However, note that the entrepreneur
will choose the mode of commercialization to maximize RE,m(·) in (5.1) in stage 2, where the
quality of the innovation k is given from stage 1. It then follows that we can use Proposition
4 to identify preemptive acquisitions, irrespective of whether the quality of an innovation is
exogenously given for the entrepreneur, or if the the entrepreneur could aﬀect the quality prior
to commercialization.
Asymmetric incumbents: We should ﬁnally note that identifying preemptive acquisitions
through Proposition 4(ii) does not require symmetric incumbents. This follows from the fact
that with a market with asymmetric incumbents, the sales price would either be the reservation
price ve or the valuation for the incumbent with the second highest valuation, v2
ii.I f t h e
invention generates negative externalities through the product market for the ﬁrm with the
second highest valuation, and if these externalities are suﬃciently strong, the acquisition price
will once more be bid up above ve.
5.2. Data
To estimate (5.4), we will use a dataset on patents granted to small ﬁrms (less than 200 em-
ployees) and individual inventors. The dataset is based on a survey of Swedish patents granted
in 1998.12 In that year, 1082 patents were granted to Swedish small ﬁrms and individuals.13
12 A further description of the data can be found at http://www.ifn.se/web/Databases_9.aspx and in
Svensson (2007).
13 In 1998, 2760 patents were granted in Sweden. 776 of these were granted to foreign ﬁrms, 902 to
large Swedish ﬁrms with more than 1000 employees, and 1082 to Swedish individuals and ﬁrms with less
than 1000 employees. In a pilot survey carried out in 2002, it turned out that large Swedish ﬁrms refused
19Information about inventors, applying ﬁrms, their addresses and the application date for each
patent was obtained from the Swedish Patent and Registration Oﬃce (PRV). Thereafter, a
questionnaire was sent out to the inventors of the patents in 2004.14 The inventors were asked
where the invention was created, if and when the invention had been commercialized, which
kind of commercialization mode was chosen, type of ﬁnancing, etc. 867 out of 1082 inventors
ﬁlled out and returned the questionnaire, i.e., the response rate was 80 percent.15
From the theory, we are interested in those patents where the inventors can decide themselves
whether to commercialize the patent. Therefore, we will only consider 624 patents where the
inventors have some ownership. 364 out of these 624 patents were commercialized, that is, the
holder received income from the patent.16 Among the 364 commercialized patents, 91 patents
were commercialized by selling or licensing the patent, and 273 patents were commercialized
by entry and own commercialization. Since the mode of commercialization is chosen from
maximizing the reward or income from an innovation, RE in (5.1), we will use commercialized
patents when estimating (5.4). The potential econometric problems arising from 260 out of 624
patents in the sample not being commercialized will be dealt with in Section 5.4.
5.2.1. Dependent variable: mode of commercialization
As the dependent variable in (5.4), we thus deﬁne a binary variable Sale taking the value of one
if the patent was sold or licensed to another ﬁrm, and zero if the patent was commercialized
internally by the inventor. Note that a sale of an invention and an exclusive licence of an
invention are equivalent in our theory. Since the licensing contracts are almost only exclusive
in the data, we treat licence contracts and sales as symmetric in the empirical analysis.17
to provide information on individual patents. Furthermore, it is impossible to persuade foreign ﬁrms to
ﬁll out questionnaires about patents. These ﬁrms are almost always large multinationals ﬁrms
14 Each patent always has at least one inventor and often an applying ﬁrm. The inventors or the
applying ﬁrm can be the owner of the patent, but the inventors can also indirectly be owners of the
patent, via the applying ﬁrm. Sometimes, the inventors are only employed in the applying ﬁrm which
owns the patent. If the patent had several inventors, the questionnaire was sent to one inventor only.
15 The falling oﬀ was not systematic. The falling oﬀ was due to 10% of the inventors having old
addresses, 5% having correct addresses but we did not get any contact with the inventors and 5% refusing
to reply. The only information we have about the non-respondents is the IPC-class of the patent and
the region of the inventors. For these variables, there was no systematic diﬀerence between respondents
and non-respondents.
16 The commercialization rate for our sample is 58 percent. This rate should be compared to the
few available studies which have measured the commercialization of patents: 47 percent for American
patents found by Morgan et al. (2001) and 55 percent in the studies surveyed by Griliches (1990). The
higher commercialization rate in the present study is explained by the fact that only patents directly or
indirectly owned by the inventors are included — large (multinational) ﬁrms have a much larger number
of defensive patents. Griliches (1990) conﬁrms this view and reports that the commercialization rate is
71 percent for small ﬁrms and inventors.
17 In many cases, when the invention to a large extent consists of indivisible assets in terms of capital or
human capital, exclusive licences are self evident. However, in some situations, several buyers might hold
a licence to utilize the innovations. Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1986) show that
there exists an equilibrium where some potential buyers are left without a licence also when multi-ﬁrm
licensing is an option. Thus, exclusivity is also a possible outcome in situations where entrepreneurs can
205.2.2. Explanatory variables
The explanatory variables used in estimating (5.4) and their expected signs are given in Table
5.1.
The quality of an invention, k To measure the quality of an invention k,w eu s et h en u m b e r
of forward citations (excluding self-citations) that a patent received from the application date
until November 2007. With patents having diﬀerent application years, the length of the time
periods they can be cited diﬀers. Therefore, in the estimations, we adjust our citation variables
so that they measure the number of forward citations in a ﬁve-year period.18
Forward citations are seen as the most important quality indicator of patents in the lit-
erature (Harhoﬀ et al., 1999; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1999; Hall et al., 2005). We divide
the forward citation variable into two groups: (i) forward citations where the cited and cit-
ing patents have at least one common technology class at the four-digit ISIC-level, denoted as
W_CIT; and (ii) forward citations where they have no common technology class at the four-
digit ISIC-level, denoted as B_CIT. Proposition 4(ii) implies that if incumbent acquisitions
are driven by preemptive motives, we would expect γk = βk−αk > 0. The quality of the inven-
tion k driving incumbents’ preemptive motives should then be reﬂected in obtaining a positive
estimate on W_CIT rather than for B_CIT, since the former should indicate how frequently
competitors cite the patent; competitors should apply for similar patents, and frequent citations
from competitors should therefore indicate high quality within the industry.19
The 624 patents in the sample together have 636 forward citations within technologies
and 79 between technologies. In table 5.2, the relationship between commercialization mode
and forward citations within technologies (W_CIT) is shown. Most patents (64 percent)
have no forward citations at all, and cited patents seldom have more than three citations.
Among non-commercialized patents, only 28 percent are cited, whereas 40 and 46 percent of
the entry and sale patents are cited. In line with the theory, we note that patents which are
commercialized through sale have a higher average number of forward citations than patents
which are commercialized through entry. Patents which are not commercialized have the lowest
average.
A potential concern with our quality measure is endogeneity, since forward citations in
general occur after the patents have been commercialized. Forward citations are registered by
administrators at the national patent oﬃces, who can be seen as independent actors; they are
hardly aﬀected by any commercialization decision. However, the fact that commercialization
by sale or entry has occurred may make competitors apply for related patents which, in turn,
sell several licences and our set-up is also valid in situations where ﬁrms have the option to sell a licence
to more than one ﬁrm.
18 Here, we follow the approach of Trajtenberg (1990) and weight the number of received patent
citations by linear time trend.
19 It is also competitors that should be interested in acquiring or licensing the patent. For example,
a high-quality drug patent, which largely aﬀects competitors’ proﬁt ﬂows, should have more citations
from future patents of drugs than from patents of semi-conductors, say. The cost for competitors should
then come from limits in their own patents or through increased costs of generating competitive new
patentable innovations.
21cite the original patent. If this is true, forward citations would increase for around 2-5 years
(the time it should take to develop a new invention and ﬁle a patent) after sale or entry has
occurred. Table 5.3 shows the number of forward citations that patents have received during the
years before and after application, entry and sale occurred. If it is assumed that a competitor
cannot apply for a new patent within two years after entry or sale occurs, it seems as if neither
entry nor sale aﬀects forward citations.20 To deal with this potential endogeneity problem, we
transform the citation variables W_CIT and B_CIT into binary variables, D_W_CIT and
D_B_CIT indicating whether a patent received a citation. Such citation dummy variables
should be less sensible to the endogeneity problem than the original ones.
Entry costs, G To measure the costs of commercialization under entry G, we use additive
dummies for diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes. Firms which already have marketing, manufacturing and
ﬁnancial resources in-house should have lower costs of entering the market for a new product,
G.W ed e ﬁne the variable SMALL taking on the value of 1 for ﬁrms with 11-200 employees,
and 0 otherwise, whereas MICRO equals 1 for micro companies with 2-10 employees, and 0
otherwise. Entrepreneurial ﬁrms with either of these characteristics should face lower entry costs
than the reference group of inventors without any employees. Since larger ﬁrms should face lower
entry costs G, the bidding competition among incumbents for entrepreneurial inventions implies
that γG = βG−αG > 0 and Proposition 4(ii) thus implies γGMicro < 0 and γGSmall < 0. In Table
5.4, the commercialization mode rates are shown for diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes. Commercialization by
sale is more frequent the smaller is ﬁrm size, whereas entry is more frequent the larger is the
ﬁrm, which is consistent with Proposition 4(ii).
Transaction costs, Γ We use the variable PVC measuring the percentage of the R&D-stage
that was ﬁnanced by private venture capitalists or business angles as a measure of transaction
costs Γ. Gans et al. (2002) ﬁnd evidence that the involvement of private venture capitalists
increased the probability of commercialization by sale, arguing that such agents have networks
with ﬁrms, thereby decreasing the search and transaction costs associated with ﬁnding an ex-
ternal buyer. Thus, if a stronger participation of venture capitalists in the commercialization
process reduces the transaction costs Γ, it follows from Proposition 4 that preemptive acquisi-
tions by incumbents of entrepreneurial innovations implies γΓPVC > 0.
Operational ﬁxed costs, τ We do not have any measure of ﬁxed operation costs, τ.I n s t e a d
we use additive dummies (ﬁxed eﬀects) for technologies and regions as well as a trend variable
for the application year, broadly controlling for unobservable technology-, region- and time-
speciﬁc factors. Patents are divided into technology groups based on the patents’ main IPC-
C l a s sa c c o r d i n gt oB r e s c h iet al. (2004). The data is also divided into six diﬀerent regions.
Five additive dummies are included for these six groups in the estimations. A trend variable
APPLY is also included, measuring the application year.
20 Note also that most entries occur about 1-3 years after the patent application (see Table 5.3), which
explains the low value of 23 citations in the ﬁrst year after entry.
225.3. Results
The results of estimating the probit model (5.4) are shown in table 5.5. Let us ﬁrst examine if
these results are consistent with preemptive acquisitions by incumbents. We start with Model
A containing the core variables from the theory, W_CIT,PVC, SMALL and MICRO,a s
well as ﬁxed eﬀects for technologies and regions. The Wald test on the core variables shows
that γ = 0 in (5.4) or, equivalently, β = α is rejected. This is also the case in the Wald test on
the full speciﬁcation of Model A.
Next, we turn to individual estimates. A higher quality of the invention as measured by more
forward citations (W_CIT) increases the probability of an invention being commercialized by
a sale to incumbents. On the other hand, presence in the market as measured by either being
a small or a micro ﬁrm (SMALL and MICRO) decreases the probability of a sale. All these
variables are statistically signiﬁcant. The estimated coeﬃcient of PVC has the correct sign,
but is not signiﬁcant. Since we can reject γ = 0 and since the coeﬃcients of the core variables
are consistent with γk = βk − αk > 0,γ Γ = βΓ − αΓ < 0 and γG = βG − αG > 0,P r o p o s i t i o n
4(ii) implies that the estimates identify incumbent acquisition as being preemptive in nature.21
In Models B and C we add between citations B_CIT and the application year APPLY,
without qualitative changes in results. The Wald tests and individual estimates are again
consistent with the Proposition 4(ii). Calculating marginal eﬀects shows that if a patent receives
one more forward citation during a ﬁve-year period, the probability of sale increases by about
ﬁve percentage points in Models A-C. If the inventor has a small ﬁrm as compared to the case
where she has no ﬁrm, the probability of sale decreases by around 20 percentage points.
Due to the potential endogeneity problem our citation variable and the distribution of
forward citations being skewed to the right, we reestimate (5.4) with the citation dummies
D_W_CIT and D_B_CIT, indicating whether a patent received a citation. These results
are shown in table 5.6. The Wald tests again reject γ = 0, whereas the results for individual
estimates are consistent with γk = βk − αk > 0,γ Γ = βΓ − αΓ < 0 and γG = βG − αG > 0.
Once more, the results are thus consistent with Proposition 4(ii), albeit some estimates are less
precise.
As a second check, we also re-estimated table 5.5 with OLS and logit speciﬁcations without
ﬁnding any qualitative changes in the results. The results were also unaﬀected by adding a
number of control variables such as the share of ownership in the entrepreneurial ﬁrms held
by the inventor, notwithstanding if the inventor had complementary patents or more patents,
individual characteristic of the inventor such a sex or ethnicity, or whether the patent was
a p p l i e di nr e s e a r c ha tau n i v e r s i t y .
5.4. Extension: the decision to commercialize
The theory presented makes the implicit assumption that all patents are commercialized. In
contrast, about 40 % of the patents in the sample were not commercialized. Among the non-
commercialized patents, 163 expired before the end of the data collection in 2005, while 97
21 The exception is γτ = βτ −ατ =0s i n c ew eh a v en od i r e c tm e a s u r eo fo p e r a t i n gﬁxed costs, τ. The
impact of τ is indirectly estimated through the Wald test on γ = β − α =0 ,w h e r et h ei m p a c to fτ is
(imprecisely) accounted for in the technology and region-ﬁxed eﬀects.
23patents remained active in 2005 and may, in principle, have been commercialized after the
observation period.22
We investigate this data problem in three ways. First, we re-estimate the probit model
in (5.4) with a sample selection correction, pooling both types of non-commercialized patents.
Second, we estimate a multinomial logit model which is based on an extension of the theory to
include the decision to not commercialize an invention. The latter model uses the information
from non-commercialized patents where the inventors actively dropped their patent. Finally,
we employ a duration analysis. This method takes account of the timing decision and controls
for the fact that some patents may have been commercialized after the sample period.
5.4.1. Selection bias
Since the group of commercialized patents may not be a random sample of patents, but may
have rather speciﬁc characteristics which led to them to be commercialized, there is a potential
sample selection problem in 5.4.
To control for this, we also model the probability of commercialization
ce = I[θ0 + θzze + θ0Xe + ue > 0], (5.6)
where ce =1if commercialization is chosen and ce =0otherwise. ze is a variable which only
aﬀects the choice to commercialize but not the mode of commercialization. The variable ze can
be considered as a variable identifying draws of low-quality inventions, or inventions associated
with high costs for commercialization, which would imply RE,m(·)+εe,m < 0 in (5.1). The
vector Xe contains the same explanatory variables as those included in the probit model (5.4).
How may selection bias aﬀect the estimates of γ in (5.4)? Suppose that ue and εe in (5.4)
and (5.6) contain an unobserved quality of the patent. From Deﬁnition 1, patents with a high
unobserved quality will tend to be commercialized. But then, since ue and εe are positively
correlated (due to the unobserved quality), commercialized patents with high unobserved quality
will tend to be sold to incumbents by Lemma 3. This selection mechanism may potentially
generate an upward bias on the estimate of γ = β − α in (5.4).
Assuming that the error terms ue and εe are correlated according to a bivariate standard
normal distribution with correlation ρ, (5.4) and (5.6) can be jointly estimated with maximum
likelihood to obtain an estimate of γ = β − α to test Proposition 4.23 Svensson (2007) shows
that government-ﬁnanced inventions are less likely to be commercialized, arguing that inventions
of inferior quality seek government support for commercialization and that the government loan
terms discourage commercialization.
In table 5.7, we report the selection model using the full sample of 624 observations. Using
the percentage of the R&D-stage ﬁnanced by government (GOV) as the identifying variable
ze, we note that the results in the second-stage sale equation do not change qualitatively in
relation to the corresponding probit speciﬁcations in table 5.5 and results are again consistent
with Proposition 4(ii). Inspecting individual estimates, we note that W_CIT is still signiﬁcant
22 This is less likely, however. In Svensson (2007), it was shown that the probability is very low that
the 97 non-commercialized patents, which are still alive, will ever be commercialized.
23See, for instance, Van den Ven and Van Pragg (1981).
24at the ﬁve-percent level. If a patent receives one more forward citation during a ﬁve-year
period, the probability of sale increases by 4-5 percentage points in Models A-C. While the ﬁrst
stage identiﬁes the commercialization decision through the government ﬁnancing variable, the
correlation between error terms ue and εe is not signiﬁcant.24
5.4.2. Identiﬁcation with multinomial logit
The probit model with selection suggests that the error terms in the commercialization decision
and the choice of type of commercialization are not correlated. Assuming this to be the case, we
can formally integrate the commercialization decision into the theory, thus providing additional
information for identiﬁcation.
To see this, let Re,No(k,τ,Γ,G)=RE,No(ke,τe,Γe,G e)+εe,No be the reward for ”No com-












Then, let m,l =( Sale,Entry,No). The probability that the entrepreneur will choose commer-
cialization mode m instead of commercialization mode l is then Prob[me]=Prob[Re,m >R e,l]
∀m 6= l,o rP r o b [ me]=Prob[εe,l − εe,m <R E,m(k,τ,Γ,G) − RE,l(k,τ,Γ,G)] ∀m 6= l.A s s u m i n g
that εe,m is distributed according to the Gumbel distribution, εe = εe,m−εe,l will be distributed
according to the logistic distribution. Under the assumption that εe,No, εe,Sale and εe,Entry are














Maximum Likelihood can now be used to estimate γSale = β − ψ and γEntry = α − ψ,w h e r e
ψ = 0 from (5.7) identiﬁes vectors β and α from (5.2) and (5.3).
In table 5.8, we show the results from estimating (5.8) for the 364 patents which are com-
mercialized (by Sale or Entry) and the 163 patents where we know that the holder actively
chose not to commercialize (i.e. the patent expired without any income for the holder).25 Given
the identifying assumption of ψ =0 , Wald tests show that β = 0,α = 0 and β = α can
all be rejected. Moreover, the parameter estimates and Wald tests on the citation variable
W_CIT and, in particular, the citation dummy D_W_CIT indicate evidence of αk > 0 in
(5.2), βk > 0 in (5.3) and βk >α k. Calculating marginal eﬀects shows that if a patent receives
one more forward citation during a ﬁve-year period, the probability of sale increases by 3.8
percentage points, entry increases by 2.6 percentage points and no commercialization decreases
by 6.4 percentage points. From the estimates of SMALL and MICRO,w ea l s on o t et h a tt h e
24 We also re-estimated table 5.6 with the citation binary variables, D_W_CIT and D_B_CIT
without a qualitative change in the results.
25 We omit the remaining 97 observations since we do not know the commercialization decision for these
patents. This right-censoring problem is taken into account in the next section which uses a duration
analysis.
25Wald tests are largely consistent with αG < 0, βG =0and that βG >α G. Thus, the results are
again consistent with Proposition 4(ii) identifying preemptive acquisitions.
The multinomial logit model gives additional evidence for the theory in terms of the reward
function in (5.2) and (5.3), and the fact that incumbents’ acquisitions are preemptive in nature.
While the multinomial logit model is informative, it has its drawbacks. As mentioned, it assumes
that the error terms in diﬀerent commercialization modes, εe,m are not correlated.26 Another
problem is that the temporal information in the data is not used. To address the latter problem,
we ﬁnally turn to event history methods, i.e. duration analysis.
5.4.3. Duration analysis
The probit model with selection and the mulitnominal logit model take into account that some
patents are not commercialized but not when a patent is commercialized, i.e. the temporal
information in the data is not used.
To illustrate, the hazard function of the events of commercialization by entry and sale is
shown in Figure 5.1, where these events are measured in years from the application date.27 The
hazard function, hm(t), shows the conditional probability of a patent commercialized by entry
or sale in a speciﬁct i m ep e r i o d∆t, given that it has “survived” (neither been commercialized by
entry nor sale) until time point t. Note that the hazard function of entry levels away more quickly
than that of sale. Thus, the timing of commercialization seems to be of importance. Inventors
who already have ﬁrms may be able to start the commercialization more quickly through entry
than inventors who try to sell or license their patents. In the latter case, inventors may face
the problem of asymmetric information when searching for an external ﬁrm. These transaction
costs may be inadequately captured by the private venture capital dummy used in the previous
analysis. Moreover, there is a time lag of 2-3 years between patent application and granting.
This means that there is an uncertainty regarding the scope of the patent protection for the
acquiring ﬁrm. Acquisition and licensing contracts may then be delayed until the grant date.28
In the survival model, we estimate how diﬀerent factors aﬀect the number of years it takes
from the time point of the patent application until the two events, TSale and TEntry,o c c u rf o r
a patent. The survival model is estimated as a competing risk model, since the two events are
mutually exclusive. Since we do not know the exact time point within a year when a patent is
commercialized, TSale and TEntry are interval-censored.29 The accelerated failure time (AFT)
26 We tried to estimate a multinomial probit model which allows for estimating the correlation structure
between the error terms. However, we then encountered the problem that our data lacks alternative-
speciﬁc variables (variables which are constant over commercialization mode).
27 The hazard can also be expressed as a function of the probability density function, f(t),a n dt h e
survival function: λ(t)=f(t)/S(t), where the survival function, S(t), shows how a large share of the
patents survives beyond a time point, t.
28 Gans et al. (2007) show empirically that patent allowance substantially increases the probability of
a licensing agreement. But as many as 27 percent of all licensing contracts occur before the patents have
been granted.
29 If the patent is sold (commercialized by the inventor) within the ﬁrst year, TSale (TEntry) obtains
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Figure 5.1: Illustrating the hazard rates for commercialization by entry and sale.
model is then the appropriate statistical model (Allison, 1995):
log(TSale,e)=X0
eζSale + σSaleεe,Sale (5.9)
log(TEntry,e)=X0
eζEntry + σEntryεe,Entry, (5.10)
where parameters ζm represent the impact of variables Xe on the expected time to commer-
cialization. Note that a positive (negative) sign implies that the time until the event occurs
increases (decreases), which is synonymous with a lower (higher) probability that the event
occurs. The error term εe,m can have various distributions, such as the log-normal, log-logistic,
exponential, Weibull and gamma distributions, where estimates of parameter σm are used to
parameterize the shape of the distribution.
The AFT models in (5.9) and (5.10) are estimated by Maximum Likelihood. When estimat-
ing the sale event in (5.9), we treat commercialization by entry (m = Entry)a sr i g h t - c e n s o r e d .
Likewise, when estimating the entry event in (5.10), we treat the event of commercialization
by sale (m = Sale) as right-censored. At the end point of observation in 2005, the holder
had not yet taken a decision on commercialization for 97 patents and these patents are thus
“right-censored” in this year. Furthermore, an expired patent cannot be commercialized. 163
non-commercialized patents that expired before 2005 are thus right-censored in this expiration
year.
Estimates of ζSale and ζEntry in (5.9) and (5.10) for the full sample of 624 observations are
shown for the log normal distribution in Table 5.7.30 Regardless of speciﬁcation or measure, as
30 The results do not change qualitatively using other distributional assumptions on the error term,
εe,m. The gamma distribution has the advantage that other distributions can be tested against the
gamma distribution. However, when applying the assumption of a gamma distribution, we did not achieve
convergence. We only report results for the log normal distribution. The results for other distributional
27shown by W_CIT in table 5.9 or D_W_CIT in table 5.10, forward citations within the same
technology class have a negative and strongly signiﬁcant impact on the time until commercial-
ization by sale occurs.31 Quantifying this eﬀect from speciﬁcation (ii) in table 5.9, if a patent
receives one more forward citation within technologies (during a ﬁve-year period), the time
until sale occurs decreases by around 30 percent. On the other hand, there is no statistically
signiﬁcant impact on the time to commercialization by entry. More importantly, we can reject
the null-hypothesis of equal estimates, ζSale
W_CIT − ζ
Entry
W_CIT =0 ,a tt h eﬁve-percent level.32 For
the variables SMALL and MICRO, proxying for the entry costs G,w eﬁnd strong evidence
on the time for commercialization by entry, while these variables have no (or statistically weak)







MICRO =0 are strongly rejected.
These results are consistent with the inventor choosing mode m in t when the reward
RE,m(·)+εe,m is highest in this alternative in a setting where inventions are sold under preemp-
tive bidding competition between incumbent ﬁrms. To see this, note that βk >α k >ψ k =0
in (5.2), (5.3) and (5.7). It then follows that increasing the quality of an invention, commer-
cialization by sale will become more proﬁtable — irrespective of if a comparison is made with
entry or no commercialization. But this inequality also shows that while higher quality makes
commercialization by entry more attractive relative to no commercialization, commercialization
by entry becomes less attractive when compared to commercialization by sale. Noting that the
impact of entry costs fulﬁls βG = ψG >α G < 0 from (5.2), (5.3) and (5.7), we can also reconcile
the results of variables SMALL and MICRO, proxying for entry costs G.
Given this interpretation of the parameter signs in the AFT models, we note that the results
do not deviate from our ﬁndings in the probit and multinomial logit models.
6. Concluding remarks
We propose a theory of the mode of commercialization (sale or entry) of entrepreneurial in-
ventions in oligopoly. We show that when the invention has a higher quality, it is more likely
that it is sold (or licensed), due to strategic product market eﬀects on the sales price. Pre-
emptive acquisitions of entrepreneurial ﬁrms by incumbents can also stimulate the process of
creative destruction by increasing the incentives to develop high-quality inventions. Moreover,
we ﬁnd evidence that high-quality inventions are sold under preemptive bidding competition us-
ing unique patent data. Consistent with the model, we ﬁnd that high entry costs are conducive
to selling.
Previous literature has shown that entrepreneurs play an important role in challenging
existing oligopolistic markets through de-novo entry into the product market. Yet, we identify
another important role of the entrepreneur as challenger of existing oligopolies through the
aggressive development of inventions for sale. The role as an aggressive invention supplier may
assumptions are available upon request.
31 The results in Model A are not aﬀected when dropping GOV.
32 Since the events are mutually exclusive, the diﬀerence in parameter estimates for a variable x can












28be even more important than the role of de-novo entrant. Indeed, we show that the possibility
of preemptive incumbent acquisition gives entrepreneurs the incentive to increase their eﬀorts in
high-quality research projects so that expected welfare can increase despite the risk of increased
market power.
Schumpeter (1942) argued that the ongoing process of "creative destruction" where inde-
pendent entrepreneurs innovate for entry is crucial for sustained growth. The development of
ﬁnancial markets and the strengthening of property rights over the last decades have, however,
implied that incumbent ﬁrms face better opportunities to protect their market from such en-
try by undertaking preemptive acquisitions. However, we have shown that the possibility of
such acquisitions creates stronger incentives for entrepreneurs to develop high-quality inven-
tions. Consequently, in the present and in the future, it may be the combination of ”creative
destruction and productive preemption” which matters for sustained growth.
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317. Appendix
7 . 1 .P r o o fo fL e m m a1
First, note that bi ≥ maxvil,l= {e,i} is a weakly dominated strategy, since no incumbent will
post a bid equal to or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the invention and that ﬁrm e
will accept a bid iﬀ bi >v e.
Inequality I1 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ =( b∗
1,b ∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume that
incumbent w 6= e is the incumbent that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets
and ﬁrm s 6= d is the incumbent with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vii is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w <v ii−ε is not an equilibrium, since ﬁrm
j 6= w,e then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w+ε, since it will then obtain the assets and pay a
price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vii−ε,a n db∗
s ∈ [vii−ε,vii−2ε],t h e nn o
incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases
since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, ve. Accordingly, the entrepreneur has
no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,,,b n,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Let incumbent h be the incumbent with the
highest bid. The entrepreneur will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ ve. But incumbent j 6= e will have the
incentive to deviate to b0 = ve + ε in period 1, since vie >v e. This contradicts the assumption
that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I2 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ =( b∗
1,b ∗
2,...,y). Then, b∗
w ≥ vij is a weakly
dominated strategy. b∗
w <v ij − ε is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm j 6= w,e then beneﬁts from
deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price lower than its
valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vii − ε,a n db∗
s ∈ [vii − ε,vii − 2ε], then no incumbent has
an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes
a selling price exceeding its valuation, ve. Accordingly, the entrepreneur has no incentive to
deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗∗ =( b∗∗
1 ,b ∗∗
2 ,...,no). Then, b∗
w ≥ vie is not an equi-
librium since the entrepreneur would then beneﬁt by deviating to yes.I f b∗
w ≤ ve,t h e nn o
incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to yes, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases
since it then sells its assets at a price below its valuation, ve. The entrepreneur has no incentive
to deviate and thus, b∗∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I3 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ =( b∗
1,b ∗
2,...,yes). Then, b∗
w ≥ vii is a weakly
dominated strategy. b∗
w <v ii − ε is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm j 6= w,e then beneﬁts from
deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price lower than its
valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vii − ε,a n db∗
s ∈ [vii − ε,vii − 2ε], then no incumbent has
an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes
a selling price exceeding its valuation, ve. Accordingly, the entrepreneur has no incentive to
deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
32Let b =( b1,...,b n,no) be a Nash equilibrium. The entrepreneur will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ ve.
But incumbent j 6= e will then have the incentive to deviate to b0 = ve + ε in stage 1, since
vie >v e. This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I4 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ =( b∗
1,b ∗
2,...,yes). Then, b∗
w >v e is not an
equilibrium since ﬁrm w would then beneﬁt from deviating to bw = ve. b∗
w <v e is not an
equilibrium, since the entrepreneur would then not accept any bid. If b∗
w = ve − ε,t h e nﬁrm
w has no incentive to deviate. By deviating to b0
j ≤ b∗
w, ﬁrm j’s, j 6= w,e,p a y o ﬀ does not
change. By deviating to b0
j >b ∗
w, ﬁrm j’s payoﬀ decreases since it must pay a price above
its willingness to pay vii. Accordingly, ﬁrm j has no incentive to deviate. By deviating to
no, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price above its valuation ve.
Accordingly, the entrepreneur has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,,,b n,yes) be a Nash equilibrium. If bw ≥ vii,t h e nﬁrm w will have the incentive
to deviate to b0 = bw − ε.I fbw <v ii, the entrepreneur will have the incentive to deviate to no,
which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,...,b n,no) be a Nash equilibrium. The entrepreneur will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ ve.
But incumbent j 6= d will have the incentive to deviate to b0 = ve + ε in stage 1 since vie >v e,
which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.




∀j ∈ J. It then directly follows that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash
equilibrium.
Then, note that the entrepreneur will accept a bid iﬀ bj ≥ ve. But bj ≥ ve is a weakly
dominating bid in these intervals, since ve > max{vii,v ie}. Thus, the assets will not be sold in
these intervals.























Number of forward 
citations within 
technologies per five-year 
period 
Dummy = 1 if the patent 
has received forward 
citations within 










































Dummy which equals 1 for 
small firms (11-200 
employees), and 0 
otherwise  
Dummy which equals 1 for 
micro firms (2-10 
employees), and 0 
otherwise 
Percentage of R&D-phase 










































































Number of forward 
citations between 
technologies per five-year 
period 
Dummy = 1 if the patent 
has received forward 
citations between 
technologies, and 0 
otherwise 
Application year 
Percentage of R&D-phase 
financed by government 



























































 Table 5.2. Commercialization mode and forward patent citations within 
technologies, number of patents and citations. 
W_CIT  No 
commercialization 









W_CIT=1    32    46  16    94 
W_CIT=2    15    24    8    47 
W_CIT=3      8    11    6    25 
W_CIT>3      17    28  12    57 
Total No. of patents  260  273  91  624 
Total No. of 
citations 
196 294  146  636 
Average No. of 
citations per patent 





Table 5.3. Forward citations (within technologies) in relation to patent application, 
entry and sale. 
 
Year 
No. of forward citations after  
Patent application (year=0)  Entry (year=0)  Sale (year=0) 
 -1 - 0 
  0 - 1 
  1 - 2 
  2 - 3 
  3 - 4 
  4 - 5 
  5 - 6 
  6 - 7 
  7 - 8 
  8 - 9 
  9 - 10 
10 - 11 
11 – 12 
  0 























  2 
  2 
13   






  7 
  9 
  6 
  8 
  4 





 Table 5.4 Commercialization mode across firm sizes, number of patents and 
percent. 
Kind of firm where invention  
was created 
Total number  
of patents 
Percent latest  





Small firms (11-200 employees)  102  70 %  63 %  7 % 
Micro companies (2-10 employees)  122  72 %  57 %  15 % 
Individuals (1-4 inventors)  400  51 %  35 %  16 % 









Table 5.5. Results of the probit model 
Explanatory  
variables 
Dependent variable = SALE 
Statistical model: Binomial probit model 



















































Log  Likelihood -185.2 -184.7 -184.4 
I. Wald, χ
2  42.8 **  43.5 **  44.2 ** 
II. Wald, χ
2  (Core var.)  20.55***  20.80***  21.79*** 
Note: The number of observations is 364. SALE equals 1 for 91 observations. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors clustered on inventor are given in parentheses. 
Parameter estimates for constants, technology and region dummies are not shown, but are available from 
the authors upon request.  
 
Wald χ
2  I tests the hypothesis γ = 0 in (5.4). Wald χ
2 test II repeats this for the core variables for W_CIT, 










Table 5.6. Results of the probit model with citation dummies 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Dependent variable = SALE 
Statistical model: Binomial probit model 



















































Log  Likelihood -185.2 -184.7 -184.4 
I. Wald, χ
2  40.9 **   41.9 **  45.1 ** 
II. Wald, χ
2  (Core var.)  19.40***  19.36***  21.32*** 
Note: The number of observations is 364. SALE equals 1 for 91 observations. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors clustered on inventor are given in parentheses. 
Parameter estimates for constants, technology and region dummies are not shown, but are available from 
the authors upon request.  
 
Wald χ
2 I tests the hypothesis γ = 0 in (5.4). Wald χ
2 test II repeats this for the core variables for D_W_CIT, 






















 Table 5.7. Results of the probit model with selectivity 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Dependent variable = SALE 
Statistical model: Binomial probit model with sample selection 
Model A  Model B  Model C 






























































































































    
                    0.216 
    (0.549) 
-582.2 
 
                    0.226 
    (0.524) 
I. Wald,χ
2   
 
      38.8**  49.43***  38.9** 49.3*** 39.5** 49.6*** 
II  Wald, χ
2        
(Core var.) 
15.3*** 20.2*** 17.8***  17.4*** 18.4*** 17.3*** 
III. Wald, χ
2         
 (ρ=0) 
0.14 0.15  0.17 
Note: The number of observations in the selection stage (commercialization decision) is 624. In the sale 
stage (mode of commercialization decision) there are 364 observations, where SALE equals 1 for 91 
observations. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors clustered 
on inventor are given in parentheses. Parameter estimates for constants, technology and region dummies 
are not shown, but are available from the authors upon request.  
 
Wald test I tests for γ = 0 in (5.5), η =(θz  Θ)’ = 0 in (5.6), respectively. Wald χ
2 test II repeats this for the 
core variables for W_CIT, SMALL, MICRO and PVC.  Wald tests III tests the null hypothesis of  no 














Multinomial logit model with “No commercialization” as the base alternative 
Model A 
(Quality measured with W_CIT) 
Model B 
(Quality measured with D_W_CIT) 




SALE ENTRY Wald χ
2
(diff) 







































































Log likelihood  483.0    -476.9   
I. Wald  χ
2   90.2***    99.4***   
II. Wald χ
2  37.2**  49.9***  39.7**  55.0*** 55.5***  38.2** 
III, Wald χ
2 (core)  13.2**  28.5***  19.0*** 23.9*** 29.2***  17.8*** 
Note : The number of observations equals 527, of which ENTRY=1 for 273 observations and SALE=1 for 
91 observations. 163 observations classified as No commercialized, where the patent has expired with the 
inventor receiving no income. Standard errors clustered on inventor are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Parameter estimates for technology and region 
dummies are not shown, but are available from the authors upon request.  
 
Wald test I tests the full specification of (5.8). Wald test II in columns two and three tests β = 0  and α = 0 
in (5.8),  respectively, under the assumption of ψ = 0.  Wald test II in column four tests  β = α.  Wald test 
III repeats these tests for the core variables W_CIT, SMALL, MICRO and PVC.  
 
The Wald tests in column four test if the individual parameter estimates of the core variables differ between 
equations. 
 
Columns five to seven repeats the procedure using specifications with variables D_W_CIT, SMALL, 
MICRO and PVC. 
 Table 5.9. Results of the survival model with competing risks, part I (cont.) 
 
Explanatory variables 
Accelerated failure time model with competing risks – log-normal model 
Model A  Model B 
ENTRY SALE Diff. χ































































































Log likelihood  -879.8  -403.6    -879.8  -403.0   
Note: The number of observations equals 624, of which ENTRY=1 for 273 observations and SALE=1 for 91 
observations. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Parameter estimates for technology and region dummies are not shown, but are available from 
the authors upon request. 
 
Note 2. A positive parameter estimate increases the time to commercialization (by entry or sale). A 
negative estimate decreases the time to commercialization (by entry or sale). 
 
 
Table 5.9. part II (cont.) 
 
Explanatory variables 
Accelerated failure time model with competing risks – log-normal model 
Model C 































































Log likelihood  -878.8  -402.8   
 
 Table 5.10. Results of the survival model with competing risks, part I (cont.) 
 
Explanatory variables 
Accelerated failure time model with competing risks – log-normal model 
Model A  Model B 
ENTRY SALE Diff. χ































































































Log likelihood  -879.8  -404.0    -879.8  -403.7   
Note: The number of observations equals 624, of which ENTRY=1 for 273 observations and SALE=1 for 91 
observations. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Parameter estimates for technology and region dummies are not shown, but are available from 
the authors upon request. 
 
 
Table 5.10. part II (cont.) 
 
Explanatory variables 
Accelerated failure time model with competing risks – log-normal model 
Model C 































































Log likelihood  -878.8  -403.7   
 
 
 
 